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1. INTRODUCTION

The exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over activities
occurring outside the borders of the United States has sparked
difficult questions about the appropriate reach of U.S. law in
a shrinking world. The application of U.S. antitrust law to the
behavior of foreign or multinational entities abroad has
created the most incendiary and confusing of situations.
Addressing this problem is difficult because the major
industrial nations have markedly different antitrust laws and
policies in these matters' and the relevant U.S. antitrust
statutes contain only cryptic clues as to their territorial
scope.' As a result, U.S. courts have struggled to sketch out
the territorial reach of antitrust laws case by case. The courts'
numerous specific rules have provided little guidance to the

foreign parties who must contend with them. Indeed, opinions
applying the rules to activities abroad have been scorned by
foreign courts,' have triggered the issuing of conflicting
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1 See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81, 94 (H.L.) (Wilberforce, L.) ("It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the
policy of one state may be to defend what it is the policy of another state to
attack.").
2 The Sherman Act begins by referring to every "contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988). The Clayton Act defines "commerce" as "trade or commerce among
the several States and with foreign nations." Id. § 12.
' See British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1954] 3
W.L.R. 505 (Ch.) (declaring that an order of a U.S. court enforcing an
antitrust decree by enjoining the English defendant from performing its
contracts to assign to English plaintiffs exclusive manufacturing and
marketing rights is "an assertion of an extraterritorial jurisdiction which we
do not recognize").
(221)
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injunctions4 and given rise to a spate of foreign statutes
designed to thwart discovery in U.S. proceedings. 5
Perhaps the most extreme manifestation of other nations'
furor at the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law
is the United Kingdom's "Clawback Act."6 In addition to
denying recognition to U.S. decrees, the Clawback Act does not
permit the recovery of punitive damages.'
During the summer of 1993, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,'
fueled the flames of controversy by ruling that a U.S. court
should not consider the interests of a foreign sovereign unless
there is a "true conflict" between U.S. law and the law of the
foreign state.9 According to the Court, a "true conflict" exists
only when foreign law requires a defendant to violate U.S. law,

or when compliance with both the laws of the United States
and those of the defendant's country is impossible."°
Never before has the Court taken so aggressive a stance on
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. The

' See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting the plaintiff an injunction prohibiting
the remaining defendants from seeking another injunction in England
against the plaintiff's antitrust suit in the United States, after some
defendants had already obtained such an injunction in England).
' See Jean Gabriel Caste, The ExtraterritorialEffects of Antitrust Law,
179 RECUEIL DES COURs D'ACADEMIE DE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 80-92
(1983) (summarizing discovery-blocking legislation in the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia and France); Thomas Scott Murleys, Note, Compelling
Productionof Documents in Violation of ForeignLaw: An Examinationand
Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 877 n.1
(1982) (citing several blocking statutes).
" The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2 (U.K.); see
also Erika Nijenhuis, Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign
Commerce: Suggestions for ProceduralReform, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1007 (1987).
" The protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6 (U.K.)
(Recovery of Awards of Multiple Damages); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction,and Reasonableness: A Reply to A.V Lowe, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 637 (1981) ("I find the Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980 a deplorable measure-a step backward both as a matter of
international law and ...as a matter of English law."); Note, Enjoiningthe
Application of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act in Private
American Antitrust Litigation, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1574, 1575-78 (1981).
8 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
9 Id. at 2919.
10
1d.
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notion of comity" was swept away, while the Court placed
greater importance on other factors, including the defendants'
express purpose to affect U.S. commerce, and the substantial
nature of the effect produced.12 In Hartford Fire, these other
factors outweighed the supposed conflict. Accordingly, the
Court exercised jurisdiction and applied U.S. law.'
Historically, U.S. courts have followed the recognized
domestic conflict of laws theories of the time to determine
whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Hartford Fire is a troubling
departure from this established trend. The Court announced
a test for determining the presence of a "true conflict" between
U.S. antitrust law and foreign law that is not grounded in
conflict of laws theory. The approach announced by the Court
will result in an aggressive outward reach by U.S. courts, as
the dissent ominously forecasted in Hartford Fire.4 This
assertive stance will likely have a detrimental effect on the
United States' relationship with its trading partners and lead
to the enactment of retaliatory legislation by foreign
sovereigns.' 5
This Article addresses the proper application of U.S.
antitrust law to foreign conduct in the aftermath of Hartford
Fire. Section 1 reviews the historical approaches to the
application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct and their
relationship to the prevailing domestic conflict of laws theory.
Section 2 discusses in detail the Hartford Fire decision. In

" "Comity" is "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens." Hilton v. Guyton, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
Comity is a discretionary doctrine "enjoin[ing] forbearance in the exercise
of legitimate jurisdiction when another sovereign also has legitimate
jurisdiction under international law." Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdictionat a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 n.1 (1982) (quoting Energy
Antimonopoly Act of 1979 (Part1): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 779 (1979) (statement of Monroe Leigh)).
1 HartfordFire, 113 S. Ct. at 2919.
13 Id.

I&
5See id.; cf. Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International
Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279,
279 (1982) (citing examples of foreign reaction and related commentary).
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Section 3, the HartfordFire decision is evaluated in terms of
modern domestic conflict of laws theory, the international legal
concept of foreign sovereign compulsion, and the accepted rules
of statutory construction. Finally, in Section 4, an "effects"type scale for the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign
conduct is proposed.
2. APPROACH To EXTRATERRITORIAL
ANTITRUST CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Through the years, U.S. courts have applied three
approaches to determine whether to apply U.S. antitrust law
to foreign conduct. Each of the approaches was inspired by, or
originated in, the domestic conflict of laws theory of its day.
2.1. The FirstRestatement: A Strict TerritorialApproach
The first approach applied to the reach of U.S. antitrust
law was the "vested rights" theory of conflict of laws, based on
the theories of Joseph Beale and the first Restatement of
Conflict of Laws."6 The "vested rights" approach directed the
forum court to apply the law of the state where the rights of
the parties vested. The methodology involved a two-step
analysis: first, the forum classified the lawsuit into a "basic"
legal category-e.g., torts, contracts, property; and second, the
forum court localized the significant event in a particular
jurisdiction and applied the law of that state. This approach,
which prevailed in U.S. courts for the first half of this century,
excluded application of U.S. law to foreign activities with
consequences in the United States, even though the "place of
wrong" rule of the First Restatement-Conflicts selected the
law of the place of injury if it differed from the law of the place
where the defendant acted: 1

'6 See JOSEPH

H. BEALE, A

TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1929

(1935) (arguing that a sovereign always wishes to apply its law to events in
its territory); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)

[hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT-CONFLICTS].
17 See FIRST RESTATEMENT-CONFLICTS
§§ 377, 378.
The First
Restatement specifies the law of the place of the wrong for nearly all issues
in torts. For contracts, the rule was the "place of making." And, for
property, the First Restatement required the application of the law of the
situs.
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The theory of the ... suit is that although the act
complained of was subject to no law having force in the
forum, it gave rise to an obligation, which, like other
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced
wherever the person may be found. But as the only
source of this obligation is the law of the place of the
act, it follows that the law determines not merely the
existence of the obligation, but equally determines its
extent.18
This rigid territorial approach was announced by the
Supreme Court in the case of American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. 19 in 1909. American Banana was a suit instituted
under the Sherman Act by an Alabama corporation against a
New Jersey corporation. The plaintiff alleged that the giant
United Fruit Company had caused the government of Costa
Rica to interfere with the operation of the plaintiff's banana
plantation in that country and had prevented the plaintiff
from buying bananas from others for export and sale.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes categorically rejected
the application of U.S. law to conduct beyond its borders.2"
In support of his position, Holmes cited Slater v. Mexican
National Railroad,2
which had determined the law
applicable to the wrongful death of a railroad employee. In
Slater, the employee was a Texas resident fatally injured in
the course of his employment in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. The
railroad that employed him was incorporated in Colorado and
ran trains from Texas into Mexico.2 2 Holmes held that
Mexican law controlled and that a suit could not be
maintained in a U.S. court even though Mexican law only
provided for recovery from wrongful death damages in
modifiable installments.2 3 Thus under a First RestatementConflicts analysis, the plaintiff's rights had vested in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico. Accordingly, Holmes concluded that no U.S.

"8Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (citations
omitted).
19 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
20 Id. at 356.
21 194 U.S. 120.
22
d at 124.
23 Id. at 128.
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court had the "power to make a decree of this kind."24 The
suit was dismissed and the plaintiffs were advised to sue "in
Mexico, on the other side of the river."25
2.2. The Second Restatement: A Balancing of Interests
Approach
A subsequent approach to the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust law gave maximum accommodation 'to the
relevant policies of the states having contact with the parties
and the transaction.2" This approach is based on the "most
significant relationship" test set forth in the Second
Restatement-Conflicts.7
24

Id.

25

Id. at 129.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT-CONFLICTS].
1 Id. § 145. The Second Restatement-Conflicts codified an existing trend
in choice of law cases toward applying the state law with the most
significant relationship to the litigation. Section 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in
[Section] 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
[Section] 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
In 1987, the American Law Institute ("ALI') published a new
restatement of foreign relations law, seeking to establish order among the
various approaches to choice of law questions in the United States and the
25

European Union. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN

RELATIONS]. The ALI concluded that under international law a state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law on the basis of territoriality (including effects)
or nationality, but only if the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
Id. §§ 402, 403(1). Section 403(2) provides that the reasonableness of the
exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is to be determined by
evaluating all relevant factors, including:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/2
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The Second Restatement-Conflicts focuses on identifying
the state with the most significant relationship to the
particular issues involved on the basis of seven general choice
(1) the needs of interstate and
of law principles:28
international systems, (2) the relevant policies of the forum,
(3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (4) the protection of justified expectations,
(5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(6) the certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(7) the ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied. These factors evince a concern for three basic
principles: governmental interests, party interests, and forum
Accordingly, the Second Restatementadministration.
Conflicts approach grants considerable leeway to the forum
It was this
court in balancing the interests involved.
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the
territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon
or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed
to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
These factors purport to restate international law as well as U.S. law.
Section 415(3) states that agreements in restraint of U.S. trade made and
carried out entirely outside the United States are subject to U.S. jurisdiction
"if such agreements ... have substantial effect on the commerce of the
United States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable." The
official commentary to section 415 emphasizes that "[t]he underlying test of
jurisdiction ...

is reasonableness, and [that] the links set out in th[e]

section are illustrative and not conclusive." THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 415 cmt. F.
28 SECOND RESTATEMENT-CONFLICTS, supra note 26, § 6.
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balancing of interests approach that displaced the strict
2"
territorial approach of American Banana.
The balancing of interests approach was first applied by
U.S. courts in 1945. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa),3" Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit
held the Sherman Act applicable to agreements abroad if they
were intended to and did have consequences in the United
States."' Jurisdiction was denied if there was a showing of
effect but not of intent, given that "Congress. . . did not intend
the Act to cover" such cases due to the possibility of
"international complications."32
In 1976, however, the Ninth Circuit in TimberlaneLumber
Co. v. Bank of America,3" announced that the test enunciated
in Alcoa was incomplete because it failed to consider fully the
interests of other nations. The court stated:
An effect on United States commerce, although
necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the
antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which
to determine whether American authority should be
asserted ....
... [T]he court should then determine whether in
the face of [the conflict] the contacts and interests of
the United States are sufficient to support the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction ... [a]s a matter of
international comity and fairness .... "
Timberlane involved an antitrust claim alleging that Bank
of America, which was incorporated in the United States, had

29 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493

U.S. 400, 407 (1990) (noting that "AmericanBanana was squarely decided
on the ground (later substantially overruled) that the antitrust laws had no
extraterritorial application") (citation omitted).
30 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The U.S. Supreme Court could not obtain
a quorum because too many justices were disqualified and therefore certified
the case to the Second Circuit. See JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN
BREWSTER, 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.05 at 147 (2d

ed. 1981).
31 148 F.2d at 443-44.
32

Id. at 443.

33 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
34

Id at 613-15.
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conspired to keep Timberlane out of the Honduran lumber
business by prevailing on Honduran officials to seize its
facilities in that country. In defense, the respondents claimed
that Honduras' activities constituted an act of state,35 and
thus were protected against antitrust action.36
In
determining whether U.S. jurisdiction was warranted in this
context, the court advocated a balancing test considering the
following factors:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
locations or principal places of business of
corporations;
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can
be expected to achieve compliance;
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere;
(5) the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce;
(6) the foreseeability of such effect; and
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad.3"
In its first hearing, the court emphasized that it was
essential to determine the extent to which there was "potential
for interference with our foreign relations."38 The court
stressed that a foreign state's sovereignty, policy or motivation
should not be challenged, particularly when the foreign state's
public policy was at stake.39 On appeal following remand,
the court found that Honduran law "intimately regulate[d]

" The act of state doctrine is a court-imposed rule of restraint under
which courts may determine, based on the merits, that adjudication is
inappropriate since it would require evaluation of the "validity of acts of a
foreign state." See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 162 (2d ed. 1987).
36 See Steven R. Swanson, A Threshold Test for Validity: The Supreme
CourtNarrows the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 889, 908

(1991).
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (numbers inserted for clarity).
Id. at 607.
Published 39by Id.
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
38

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:2

private commercial activity,"0 promoting investment and

capital growth in Honduras in an attempt to foster domestic
competitiveness in world markets. The court noted that
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law "create[d] a
potential conflict with the Honduran government's effort to
foster a particular type of business climate."4 '
In comparing the relative significance of effects in the
United States and abroad, the court noted that Bank of
America's activities had a significant impact on the Honduran
economy, as they affected domestic employment, taxes
collected in foreign currency and overall investment in
domestic industry. The court determined that these factors
outweighed any potential anticompetitive effect on U.S.
commerce. The court also pointed out that all illegal activity
took place outside the United States. For these reasons, the
court ruled that the United States should not exercise
jurisdiction." The court summarized its comity analysis by
noting:
The potential for conflict with Honduran economic
policy and commercial law is great .... The evidence of

intent to harm American commerce is altogether
lacking. The foreseeability of the anticompetitive
consequences of the allegedly illegal actions is slight.
Most of the conduct that must be examined occurred
abroad. The factors that favor jurisdiction are the
[U.S.] citizenship of the parties and, to a slight extent,
the enforcement effectiveness of United States law. We
do not believe that this is enough to justify the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over this case.43
Many courts adopted the precedent set in Timberlane."
Several variations of the comity balancing test have also been
The Third Circuit in
applied by subsequent courts.

40

749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).

Id.
42 Id. at 1386.
41

43 Id.

44 See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Products, Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products,
Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Col. 1993); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP
North Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); McElderry
v. Cathay Pac. Airways, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,4" for example,
expanded the Timberlane test by suggesting that the balancing
test be applied twice:
first, in determining whether
jurisdiction exists, and second, in determining whether to
exercise jurisdiction, taking into account considerations of
comity.4 6 The Mannington court also expanded the list of
factors to be considered in determining whether to assert
jurisdiction. Factors relevant to this analysis include the
following: (1) the availability of a remedy abroad; (2) the
possible effect on foreign relations; and (3) whether an order
for relief imposed abroad would also be acceptable if imposed
in the United States."
2.3. Currie'sInterestAnalysis: The True Conflicts Approach
The third approach to determining the territorial scope of
U.S. antitrust law is the true conflicts approach. Professor
Brainerd Currie first introduced the concept of a "true conflict"
in his "governmental interest analysis" approach to resolving
choice of law questions.4 8 Under Currie's theory, a court
must always apply forum law unless some party suggests the
application of the laws of another state.4 9 If a foreign law is
suggested, the court is to determine the governmental policies
to be enforced by the forum.5"
Having identified those
policies, an interest analysis is then performed to identify the
circumstances in which each state would wish to see its law
applied.5 '
Currie's approach does not involve judicial
balancing of policies.
Currie's theory identifies four scenarios: (1) false conflict,
(2) true conflict, (3) the disinterested forum, and (4) the

4r 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
46
Id. at 1294.
47
Id. at 1297-98.
48 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
GovernmentalInterests and JudicialFunction, in SELECTED ESSAYs ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963) (explaining governmental interest
analysis).
48

50

Id. at 183.
Id.

5' For instance, if an out-of-state plaintiff sought a punitive damages
recovery, the forum state would have no interest in asserting its law
granting punitive damages.
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"unprovided for case." First, a "false conflict" exists when only
one state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law
to resolve the issue.52 In this situation, the court simply
applies the law of the state with the interest.5 3 Second, a
"true conflict" exists when the relevant laws not only differ,
but each state has a "legitimate interest" in the application of
its law to resolve the issue. In such a situation, the court
should apply the forum state's law." Third, if the forum has
no interest of its own to further in the matter, i.e., it is a
"disinterested forum," but a conflict exists between the laws of
two other states, then Currie suggested that the disinterested
forum either act like a legislature and make a value judgment
as to which law it thinks is better, or apply the law that most
resembles its own (on the theory that the forum legislation-has
already been determined to be more sound). Lastly, if no state
has a policy interest in applying its own law, an "unprovidedfor-case" exists, and Currie advocated applying forum law.55

5 For a classic example of a false conflict, see Babcock v. Jackson, 191
N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). In Babcock, the plaintiff rode as a guest in the
defendant's automobile from Rochester, N.Y. to Ontario, Canada. The
defendant lost control of his car in Ontario and thereby injured the plaintiff.
Ontario had a "guest statute" that immunized drivers from liability
stemming from injury to their passengers. New York did not have a similar
law. Id. at 281. The New York Court of Appeals found that only New York
had an interest in applying its policy: "Ontario has no conceivable interest
in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for
injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious under
Ontario law." Id at 284. By contrast, New York's interest lay in requiring
tortfeasors to compensate victims. Id.
At least one commentator believes that the term "false conflicts" has a
broader definition, which includes cases where the forums have unequal
interests. Peter K. Westin, Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CAL. L. REV. 74
(1967).
5 Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
"Currie, supra note 48, at 357.
Brainerd Currie, The DisinterestedThird State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 754 (1963). Currie thought that such "unprovided-for-cases" would
rarely arise because states would usually have interests. Id. at 765.
Nonetheless, he found the prospect so troubling that he created a
hypothetical situation in which neither state would care about the result.
Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in
the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 229 (1958). In his hypothetical
case, a California resident injures an Arizona resident in Arizona. Id.
Before the plaintiff can bring suit, the California resident dies. California
allows survival of tort actions presumably because it finds compensating
plaintiffs more important than protecting estates from depletion by lawsuit.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/2
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An example of Currie's approach to the "true conflict"
scenario is the decision in Foster v. Leggett.5" The Kentucky
court was faced with a complex situation in a guest statute
case. The plaintiff's decedent was a Kentucky resident, while
the defendant was a former Kentuckian, now domiciled across
the Ohio River in Ohio. The defendant, however, worked in
Kentucky and maintained a room at the YMCA near his place
of employment. The accident occurred in Ohio on a day trip
which started and was to end in Kentucky. The defendant and
the decedent had worked together for many years and had
been dating for several months. Ohio's guest statute barred
recovery by a guest absent willful and wanton misconduct by
the driver. Kentucky had no such rule. The court rejected any
weighing of interests and applied Kentucky law,5" stating
that "[w]hen the court has jurisdiction of the parties its
primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.
The basic law is the law of the forum, which should not be
displaced without valid reasons. " "
The true conflicts approach is a presumption in favor of
application. If U.S. interests are affected because conduct
abroad causes significant effects here, the U.S. law applies.
Any protests of foreign litigants and their governments will be
resolved at the governmental level by changes in U.S. or
foreign law and by intergovernmental agreements.
This approach was announced in 1984 by the D.C. Circuit
in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.5"
In Laker, the U.S. court faced a head-on jurisdictional conflict:
the United Kingdom was attempting to assert exclusive
jurisdiction in a case involving the regulation of international
air transportation, an area in which the policies of the United
States and the United Kingdom conflicted. The court rejected
Timberlane's comity formula as inadequate to resolve the

Id. at 219. Arizona, at the time, allowed tort actions to abate if the
defendant died. Id. at 220. According to Currie, California would not care
if an Arizona resident received compensation, and Arizona would not care
about the depletion of a California estate. Id. at 229.
56 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).

" Although the terminology employed in the opinion suggests a Second
Restatement-Conflicts analysis, the rationale is strictly Currie's.
58 484 S.W.2d at 829.

731Law:
F.2d
909
(D.C. Cir.
1984). 2014
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competing interests. 0

The substantive dispute in this case involved a claim by a
U.K. businessman, Freddie Laker, that several British and
U.S. airlines conspired to put him out of business after he
instituted a competing, low-budget London-New York shuttle.
The defendant, British Airways, sought an injunction in the
U.K. courts to prevent Laker from proceeding with his claim
in the U.S. court system. Based on British Airways' argument
that it was merely complying with British governmental orders
in applying its tariff schedule, the injunction was granted. In
response, Laker sought an injunction in the United States
barring any remaining defendants from seeking protection in
the United Kingdom. The U.S. district court granted Laker's
motion, and ultimately, the D.C. Circuit affirmed.6
In reaching this decision, Judge Wilkey first noted the
practical difficulties courts face in attempting to identify,
evaluate and weigh foreign interests and policies and the
further difficulty of attempting to conduct a neutral balancing
of the competing interests. More generally, the court noted
that it is in precisely the context of a "true conflict" between
U.S. and foreign interests that balancing is most difficult.6"
Judge Wilkey suggested that the court examine whether
each nation has a reasonable basis for prescriptive (legislative)
jurisdiction. To ascertain this, Wilkey argued that the court
should only look to the prescribing state's interests in
determining whether its contacts with the transaction justify
the court's acceptance of the case. 3
In making this assessment, the court found several
balancing factors listed in Timberlane to be relevant:
specifically, the presence or absence of an intent to affect U.S.
foreign commerce, an actual effect on such commerce, situs of
the conduct and location of the parties and nationality of the
parties.64 The court, however, did not take into account
foreign interests in determining whether to assert jurisdiction.
6o Id at 950.
61Id- at 956.
62 Id. at 948-50.
63 See id.

4 Id. at 948 n. 145. These factors are also listed as relevant under the
principles of reasonableness in the Third Restatement-ForeignRelations
§ 403(2)(a)-(c) (1986).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/2
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Therefore, certain factors listed in Timberlane, such as degree
of conflict with foreign law or policy and likelihood of conflict
with regulation by other states, were not considered.65 The
importance of regulation to the regulating state was also
deemed irrelevant.6" To the court, a judicial balancing of
competing foreign and domestic interests would be improper.
In particular, the court noted:
We are in no position to adjudicate the relative
importance of antitrust regulation or nonregulation to
the United States and the United Kingdom. It is the
crucial importance of these policies which has created
the conflict. A proclamation by judicial flat that one
interest is less "important" than the other will not erase
a real conflict."7
Applying this analysis, the Laker court concluded that both
countries had reasonable bases for jurisdiction.68 In taking
this position, the court conceded that the exercise of
jurisdiction by the United States would be a source of conflict.
The court, however, reasoned that it was up to the political
branches of the government, not the judiciary, to allocate
exclusive jurisdiction between the countries.69 Until such
allocation occurs, foreign interests should not be deemed to
outweigh U.S. interests once the basic jurisdictional threshold
of "direct, substantial, [and] reasonably foreseeable,
anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce" is established."0

or 731 F.2d at 949. The latter factor refers to principles suggested in the
Third Restatement-ForeignRelations § 403(2)(h).
66 731 F.2d at 949. But see THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 403(2)(c)-(e) (listing this factor as relevant).
67 731 F.2d at 949 (citation omitted).
8 See id. at 926.
69 Id.
at 955.
70 Justice Blackmun, citing Laker in his concurrence in Societe Nationale
IndustrielleAerospatialev. United States Dist. Court, noted that "[it is the
Executive that normally decides when a course of action is important
enough to risk affronting a foreign nation or placing a strain on foreign
commerce. It is the Executive, as well, that is best equipped to determine
how to accommodate foreign interests along with our own." 482 U.S. 522,
552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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3. THE HARTFORD FIRE DECISION

The Timberlane/Laker debate has created a controversy
among the federal circuits as to the proper approach to conflict
resolution in antitrust cases. The Third, Fifth, and Tenth
circuits have accepted the Timberlane comity analysis, 1
while the D.C. and Seventh circuits have severely criticized
it.7" The issue was placed squarely before the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California." While not
explicitly rejecting a Timberlane-like analysis, the Court
makes clear in its opinion that U.S. courts should not
reflexively invoke the Timberlane comity test to avoid
adjudicating Sherman Act cases attacking restrictive practices
and cartelization conducted abroad.
3.1. The Facts
The Hartford Fire case arose in 1988 when the attorneys
general of eight states and many private plaintiffs filed
antitrust suits against several U.S. and U.K. insurance
companies. The complaints contended that the insurance
companies had violated the Sherman Act by agreeing to alter
certain terms of insurance coverage and agreeing not to offer
certain other types of coverage.74 Included among the
defendants were a number of London-based reinsurers that,
according to the plaintiffs, had conspired to: (1) restrict the
terms on which reinsurance would be written; (2) refuse to
reinsure certain risks; (3) write all North American casualty
reinsurance agreements with a pollution exclusion; and
(4) boycott retrocessional reinsurance agreements that
included certain North American property risks, unless the

71

See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85

(5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted and vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, cert. denied, 464

U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 868-69
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
72 See Laker, 731 F.2d at 939-41; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617
F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
73 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
71 In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468, 470-71
(N.D.
Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in relevant part and

rev'd in part sub nom., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891
(1993).
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original insurance contained certain exclusions. 5
The U.K. defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
against them on the ground that the Sherman Act should not
apply to conduct carried out by non-Americans entirely outside
the United States that was lawful where it occurred.e
The district court held that the U.K. defendants' challenged
foreign conduct was subject to jurisdiction under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA").'
According to the district court, the "plaintiffs ...

adequately

alleged that a decision not to provide reinsurance or
retrocessional reinsurance to cover certain types of risks in the
United States has a direct effect on the availability of primary
insurance in the United States." 8
Applying the three-part test laid down by the Ninth Circuit
in Timberlane 9 however, the district court concluded that
upon consideration of the tests international comity factor,
extraterritorial jurisdiction should not be asserted.80 The
75See

id.

7Id. at 471-72.
7 IM at 486. The relevant section of the FTAIA reads:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to
conduct involving trade or commerce (other than important trade
or import commerce) with foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only
because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of
this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
" 723 F. Supp. at 486.
7 Under the Timberlane inquiry, a court examines: "(1) the effect or
intended effect on the foreign commerce of the United States; (2) the type
and magnitude of the alleged illegal behavior; and (3) the appropriateness
of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of
international comity and fairness." 749 F.2d at 1382. See also supra § 2.2.
" 723 F. Supp. at 487-90.
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court observed that the long-standing practices in the London
reinsurance market challenged by the complaints were "openly
conducted in conformity with English law""' and were
"directed primarily at reducing [the British defendants']
exposure to certain risks and controlling losses, a legitimate
business purpose. 8 2 Accordingly, the district court declined
to exercise jurisdiction.
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district
court's holding that the alleged effects in the United States
were sufficient under the FTAIA, but reversed the lower
court's conclusion that international comity required a
dismissal.8 " In assessing whether comity should be deemed
to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts, the
panel reasoned that the enactment of the FTAIA had a
profound effect on the Timberlane comity test: "We do not
believe a Timberlane analysis ... can be unaffected by the
statute." 4 The panel evaluated the Timberlane factors and,
as to the "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy," stated:
The district court found that application of the antitrust
laws to the London reinsurance market 'would lead to
significant conflict with English law and policy.' The
British [amicus curiae] brief reiterates that conclusion;
we do not doubt its accuracy. Such a conflict, unless
outweighed by other factors, would by itself be reason
to decline exercise of jurisdiction. 5
After evaluating five of the six other factors of the Timberlane
test, the panel concluded that the only consideration pointing
toward non-application of U.S. law was the conflict with U.K.
policy and that this was insufficient to overcome "the weight
of the findings already made under the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act." 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether "the court of appeals properly assess[ed] the
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws in light of this
at 488.
Id. at 490.

8' Id.
82

83 938 F.2d at 932-34.
84

1d. at 932.
Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
86d. at 934.
81
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Court's teachings and contemporary understanding of
international law when it held that a U.S. district court may
apply U.S. law to the conduct of a foreign insurance market
regulated abroad?""7
3.2. The Foreign Defendants' And British Government's
Positions
On appeal, the U.K. defendants argued that established
principles of comity counselled against subjecting them to
liability under the U.S. antitrust laws for conduct which they
allegedly committed while offering reinsurance in U.K.
markets.8" The U.K. industry, according to the defendants,
was comprehensively regulated by the U.K. government. The
U.K. government has taken the position that U.S. antitrust
law should not be applied against U.K. insurers for most
conduct undertaken outside of U.S. borders. 89
The U.K. government formally opposed the application of
U.S. antitrust law to the U.K. reinsurers, 0 reiterating what
it told the Ninth Circuit and what that court had accepted:
"[T]o subject British nationals to substantial legal liability for
conduct in London which the district court properly found was
'conducted in conformity with English law ...
[for] a
legitimate business purpose'" would raise a substantial
conflict with U.K. law and policy.9 The U.K. government
argued that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
because the legislative history of the FTAIA indicates that the
statute was "meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S." 2 Even if the Court decided to apply
the FTAIA extraterritorially, the U.K. Government argued

"' Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. at 2900 n.9 (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two other issues, as
well. These questions involved the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
are not relevant to the present discussion. Id. n.8 (citation omitted). The
U.K., Canadian and U.S. governments filed amicus curiae briefs, as did a
number of insurance entities.
88 Brief for Petitioners in No. 91-1128 at 22-27.
'Id

at 23.

,o See Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10-26
(No. 91-1128) [hereinafter U.K. Brief].
"Ia at 13.
92 Id. at 10, 16-21.
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that U.S. courts should opt against the exercise of jurisdiction
"because of considerations of international comity."93
3.3. The Domestic Plaintiffs'And U.S. Government'sPositions
The plaintiffs argued that there was no conflict with
British law or policy, and that, indeed, the conduct alleged in
the complaints would have formed the basis of liability under
British law if the conduct were to be evaluated under British
rather than U.S. law. 4 Further, according to the plaintiffs,
even if a conflict existed, the balancing test under Timberlane
supported jurisdiction because most of the factors favored the
application of U.S. law. 5
The U.S. government argued that a Timberlane-like comity
analysis should be performed only when there is a "true
conflict."96 According to the U.S. government, a conflict for

3Id. at 10.
""See Brief for Respondent States in No. 91-1128 at 26-38.
"Id. at 38-41.
"Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
27 (Nos. 91-1111 and 91-1128).
The U.S. Justice Department has adopted the position that the weighing
of foreign interests is a matter of comity and prosecutorial discretion rather
than a matter of law. The International Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Justice Department has developed guidelines for determining when to
prosecute anticompetitive conduct. These guidelines parallel the type of
jurisdictional analysis used by courts followingthe Timberlanedecision. See
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,109.10 (Dep't Justice Nov. 10, 1988). The Department
first requires a showing that the anticompetitive conduct has a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce." Foreign
Restraints on U.S. Exports-Consumer Injury, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 13,108 (Dep't Justice Apr. 3, 1992). It then applies a comity analysis,
similar to that employed in Timberlane, which attempts to balance the
interests of the U.S. government in preserving markets and protecting U.S.
consumers against the interests of the affected foreign sovereign in
promoting its own laws and policies. Id. The Justice Department has
indicated that it considers a number of factors in its comity analysis,
including the following:
1) [the] relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct
within the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct;
3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States
consumers or competitors;
4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss2/2

HARTFORD FIRE

1994]

comity purposes exists only if "(1) a foreign government has
directed the defendants to engage in the disputed conduct, or
(2) the defendants could not have avoided engaging in the
disputed conduct without frustrating clearly articulated
policies of the foreign government."" The U.S. government
asserted that in applying the Timberlanetest in this case, both
of the courts below had erroneously concluded that application
of the U.S. antitrust laws would create a conflict with British
law. The United States argued that this conclusion was based
on a "misunderstanding of the type of conflict that is relevant
for purposes of comity analysis." 8 Finally, the United States
argued that even assuming that the Timberlane analysis was
correctly applied in the case, the standard was not met. 9
3.4. The Majority Decision
Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens, held that since the
alleged foreign conduct at issue was "meant to produce and did
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States,"
the Sherman Act applied to that foreign conduct."
The
states, the Court noted, alleged that the London reinsurers
engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for
insurance in the United States, and that their conduct in fact
produced a substantial effect in the United States."'
According to Justice Souter, "the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States."' 2 He

5)
6)

the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; and
the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies.

BARRY E. HAWK, 1 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 152.1 (1991). The Department will

challenge foreign conduct only if it concludes, as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, that an assertion of jurisdiction would be reasonable. Id. at
152.3.
97

d. at 28.

98 Id.at 27.
"Id at 28.
10 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. at 2909.
101 See id. at 2908-11.
'0 k1I at 2909.
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noted that when Congress enacted the FTAIA, it declined to
express a view on whether a court with jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act should abstain from exercising such jurisdiction
on the ground of international comity." s
Nonetheless,
Souter declared that the Court need not decide that question
because, even assuming an affirmative answer, "international
comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the
circumstances alleged here."' °
The Court found that there was no "true conflict" between
U.S. and British law."0 5
It was argued that a conflict
between U.S. and British law arose because the challenged
conduct was consistent with British law and policy. The
Court, however, relying on Section 415 of the Third
Restatement-ForeignRelations, held that a true conflict does
not exist when a person subject to regulation by two nations
can comply with the laws of both. 10 6
The Court observed that the British reinsurers did not
argue that British law required them to act in a fashion
prohibited by U.S. law, nor did they argue that their
compliance with the laws of both countries was otherwise
impossible."° Thus, according to the Court, there was no
"true conflict" and, therefore, no need to consider whether the
U.S. court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the
basis of international comity.'
3.5. The DissentingOpinion
In a dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Thomas, voiced sharp disagreement with the
Court's "conclu[sion] that no 'true conflict' counseling
nonapplication

of United States law ...

exists unless

compliance with United States law would constitute a violation
of another country's law."'
The dissent argued that under
the factors set forth in Section 403 of the ThirdRestatement-

103

See id. at 2910.

104Id

See id. at 2908-11.
lo See id. at 2910.
105

See id. at 2911.
log I&.
1'1

log Id. at 2921-22 (emphasis in original).
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ForeignRelations, any nation having a basis for jurisdiction to
prescribe a law must refrain from exercising that jurisdiction
if such an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable."0
Justice Scalia wrote that:
Rarely would these factors point more clearly against
application of United States law ... I think it
unimaginable that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered
reasonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume,
in the absence of statutory indication to the contrary,
that Congress has made such an assertion."'
Justice Scalia argued that the majority "completely
misinterpreted" the ThirdRestatement-ForeignRelations, and
characterized the majority's view that no true conflict exists
"unless compliance with United States law would constitute a
violation of another country's law," as a "breathtakingly broad
proposition, which contradicts the many cases discussed
earlier."11 2 Justice Scalia and his dissenting colleagues
predicted that the majority's holding "will bring the Sherman
Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with
the legitimate interests of other countries-particularly our
closest trading partners."1
4. THE FALLOUT OF HARTFORD FIRE:
THE REMAINS OF COMITY
Following the Court's decision in Hartford Fire, it is
unlikely that defendants could successfully invoke the
principle of international comity in a U.S. antitrust case. The
Court specifically noted that in enacting the FTAIA, Congress
declined to express a view on whether a court with Sherman
Act jurisdiction ever should decline to exercise that jurisdiction
on the grounds of international comity."" Nonetheless, the
Court found that comity would not require abstention from the
exercise of jurisdiction in Hartford Fire, because the British

110 See

id.

"I Id. at 2921.

Id. at 2921-22.
I& at 2922.
114 See id. at 2910.
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defendants did not contend that in the absence of a "true
conflict" the court should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction." 5
Thus, under the HartfordFire approach, a U.S. court has
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act over "foreign conduct that
was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States.""'
If there exists such a
substantial effect, only in cases of "true conflict" between U.S.
and foreign law will a court have the opportunity to consider
whether that conflict requires abstention from the exercise of
jurisdiction on the basis of comity.
4.1. The Court'sNotion Of A "True Conflict"
In HartfordFire,Justice Souter defines a "true conflict" as
(1) when the foreign law requires the defendant to act in a
fashion prohibited by U.S. law, or (2) when compliance with
the laws of the United States and the defendant's country is
otherwise impossible." 7 Rarely, if ever, will such a "true
conflict" be found."' Justice Souter's definition of a "true
conflict" is an unjustifiably narrow construction, with no basis
in modern conflict of laws theory.
4.2. The Modern Meaning Of A "True Conflict" and Its
Resolution
The majority of states in this country reject Currie's
straight "governmental analysis" in resolving choice of law
questions."'
Most states require that following the
determination that a "true conflict" exists (e.g., when two or
115 Id
11
Id. at 2909.
117 Id at 2911.
118 See, e.g., Continental Ore. Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 707 (1962); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303
(3d Cir. 1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,

1293 (3d Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,414, 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"'

Only four states use Currie's governmental analysis in tort actions.

See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

859 (1976); Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268
(D.C. 1987); Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
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more states have laws that differ and each state has an
interest in applying its laws to the issue), a subsequent
weighing of the states' interests must be performed to
determine which state has the most significant relationship to
the conduct or would be least impaired by the application of
the other states' substantive law. 20 In effect, the modern
approach is a hybrid that tempers Currie's forum-preferential
view with the balancing of interests approach of the Second
Restatement-Conflicts.
A few examples are illustrative of this modern approach.
In Hataway v. McKinley,' 2 ' the parents of Grady Hataway
brought a wrongful death action against a teacher for the
death of their son in an Arkansas rock quarry.'22 The
Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to apply
Tennessee law, after the trial court had applied Arkansas law
as the place where the injury occurred. Initially, the Hataway
court determined that a "true conflict" existed between
Tennessee and Arkansas law 3 because Tennessee at that
time was a contributory negligence state while Arkansas
applied comparative fault to negligence issues."M The two
states had differing wrongful death statutes as well. Arkansas
allowed "recovery 'for the pecuniary injuries ...

and mental

1 0 See, e g., Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska
1985); Bryant v. Silvernman, 703 P.2d 1190 (Ariz. 1985); First Nat'l Bank
v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13
(Conn. 1986); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38 (Del. 1991); Bishop
v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Johnson v.
Pischke, 700 P.2d 19 (Idaho 1985); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill.
1970); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987); Fuerste
v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So. 2d
193 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 461 So. 2d 319 (La. 1984); Adams v. Buffalo
Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416
(Mass. 1976); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Harper v. Silva,
399 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1987); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio
1984); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson
Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); Hataway v. McKinley, 830
S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979);
Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1976).

1'2 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992).
122

Id. at 54. Grady Hataway took a scuba diving class from the
defendant Robert McKinley at Memphis State University. Hataway died at
an Arkansas rock quarry where the class went scuba diving as part of an
exercise. Id.
12
s Id .
24
1

1&

at 55.
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anguish resulting from the death'" while Tennessee went
further to allow recovery for "mental and physical
suffering." 2 ' The court applied the Second RestatementConflicts "most significant relationship" test to the case, and
determined that Tennessee law applied to the case.' 6
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Lake,' the Delaware
Supreme Court applied Delaware law and held that an insured
driver could recover against the insurance carrier for an
accident that occurred in Quebec, Canada.
The court
determined that there was a "true conflict" because Quebec
law limited recovery to $29,400, while Delaware law allowed
recovery to the full extent of the insurance policy. The
Delaware court applied the most significant relationship test
and concluded that Delaware law should be applied because
Quebec had no real interest in the litigation. 2 '
In Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson,.29 an Indiana
resident brought a wrongful death action against an Indiana
manufacturer for the death of an Indiana resident that
occurred while he was using a defective lift in Illinois. 30
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that a "true conflict" of law
existed because Indiana applies the defense of contributory
negligence while Illinois uses a comparative fault scheme. 31'
The court applied the "most significant relationship" test and
determined that Illinois had minimal connections to the cause
of action. Therefore, the court applied Indiana law because
Indiana had
the most significant relationship with the
13 2

litigation.

Contrary to Justice Souter's definition, these cases
illustrate that a "true conflict" does not require that the
alleged unlawful conduct be compelled by the law of the
foreign state or that it be impossible for the defendant to
comply with both the law of the foreign state and the forum
state. Rather, a "true conflict" requires only that the laws of
125

IdId. at 60.
127 594 A.2d 38 (Del. 1991).
128 Id. at 48.
129 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
130
d. at 1072.
131 Id. at 1073.
1 26

'3 Id. at 1074.
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two or more states differ with respect to the treatment of the
alleged conduct at issue.
In addition, when a difference exists between the
substantive laws of two states in the United States and each
state has an interest in applying its law to the conduct
involved (i.e., a "true conflict" in domestic conflict of laws
parlance), a subsequent interest based analysis is conducted
to determine which state has the greater interest in applying
its law to the alleged conduct. In other words, after finding a
"true conflict" under a pure Curriean analysis, the court shifts
to a Second Restatement-Conflicts analysis of balancing the
interests involved, i.e., a comity analysis.
Justice Souter's opinion, however, does not make clear
whether such a comity analysis would be proper if in fact a
"true conflict," as he defined it, were found. Indeed, as is
discussed in the next section, if such a "true conflict" exists, a
subsequent comity analysis may not even be necessary because
of the international legal concept of foreign sovereign
compulsion and accepted rules of statutory construction.
4.3. Has The Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Defense Been
Consumed By HartfordFire?
The Court's approach to conflict resolution in HartfordFire
is antithetical to any modern conflict of laws theory, and it
confuses the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine with the
type of conflict that requires balancing in a comity analysis.
Under the Court's approach, a conflict sufficient to trigger a
comity analysis exists, if at all, only where there is foreign
sovereign compulsion.
The foreign sovereign compulsion defense immunizes
private entities from liability for actions compelled by foreign
governments. The bases for this defense are notions of
fairness to the defendant, the belief that we should not punish
involuntary conduct, 3 ' and comity. Courts recognize that
the imposition of antitrust liability on private parties acting in
compliance with foreign law implicitly condemns that law. In
this respect, imposing liability is seen as an "unwarranted

" See Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, The Restatement and
ForeignSovereign Compulsion: A Pleafor Due Process, 23 INT'L LAW. 593,
596 (1989).
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intrusion" into the affairs of a foreign state.'3
In the vast majority of litigated cases, including Hartford
Fire, the foreign conduct has been consistent with, permitted
by, encouraged or otherwise approved of, but not compelled by,
foreign law. In these instances, compliance with U.S. law has
not constituted a violation of foreign law.'35 As in Hartford
Fire,in most cases litigated to date, the defendants' conduct in
a foreign state was wholly legal and consistent with the
economic policy of the foreign state, even though the conduct
was not expressly mandated.'
As a consequence of the approach to conflict resolution
adopted by the Court in Hartford Fire, there is now no basis
for engaging in a balancing of competing interests. If a U.S.
court finds a "true conflict" (when the defendant's conduct that
violated U.S. law was compelled by the foreign law), no
subsequent analysis of the foreign state's interests in applying
its law would be required. Under the doctrine of foreign
sovereign compulsion, U.S. antitrust laws must give way to the
foreign law.
The Court's approach is also seemingly at odds with the
U.S. government's longstanding position on the use and

13 Commentators point to section 403 of the ThirdRestatement-Foreign

Relations, which suggests that it would be unreasonable to exercise
jurisdiction to prevent conduct that is "compelled by a foreign sovereign."
THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403.
1
See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 702 n.11, 704 (1962) (mere delegation of authority insufficient);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir.
1979) ("mere approval" by foreign government insufficient for compulsion
defense); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr., 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962) (private
initiative with approval from Swiss government distinguished from
compelled government mandate).' See, e.g., United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1968). The Third Restatement-Foreign Relations draws a sharp
distinction between foreign compulsion cases, which it treats in section 441,
and cases involving overlapping state interests and the likelihood of conflict.
In the latter instance, in which the conflict need not present the sort of
impossibility of compliance that would amount to a violation of due process
if both commands are enforced, section 403(3) states that "each state has an
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in
exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, [including those
set out in] Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater."
THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 403(3).
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recognition of the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.
While "mere encouragement or permission" is insufficient to
invoke the defense, the U.S. Justice Department considers the
level of compulsion in determining whether to prosecute a case
involving conflicting commands.13 7
In
particular,
"considerations of international comity may lead the
Department not to challenge anticompetitive conduct that is
not strictly compelled by a foreign sovereign but has clearly
arisen from the decisions and actions of the foreign sovereign
and is intended to promote significant national economic
interests of the sovereign."13s
4.4. Has HartfordFire Incinerated The Canons Of Statutory
ConstructionIn The Antitrust Context?
The Court's decision in Hartford Fire also ignores the
well-established canon of interpretation that statutes should
not be construed to apply extraterritorially to conflict with
foreign local law, absent a clearly expressed legislative
purpose to the contrary."' Although U.S. antitrust law has
been applied to foreign conduct, the "canon of construction"
against extraterritorial application prevents application of
other U.S. laws to events abroad.1 4 Justice Souter's opinion
fails to address why the antitrust laws should be treated
differently.
As recently as 1991, in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),4 ' the

'

HAWK, supra note 96, at 625.

at 553.
1' Id.
Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111

S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Indep. Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 923 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Railway Labor
Act does not apply to collective bargaining agreements allegedly breached
by the hiring of foreign nationals for intra-European flights), opinion
withdrawn, 966 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1992) (withdrawing the opinion for
mootness and remanding to the district court to determine whether the

judgment-that the Act did not apply extraterritorially-should be vacated
for mootness).
140 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For use of this canon in American Banana, see 213

U.S. at 357 ("[1In case of doubt [a court should construe] any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits

over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.").
141 111 S. Ct. 1227.
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Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not apply extraterritorially to prohibit
discrimination in Saudi Arabia against a U.S. citizen by a
Delaware corporation. The employee alleging discrimination,
though born in Lebanon, was a naturalized U.S. citizen,
employed in Houston by a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Arabian American Oil Co., before being transferred at his
request to Saudi Arabia.
In rejecting the application of U.S. law to the foreign
conduct, the Court relied on the canon of construction that
beguiled Justice Holmes in American Banana: "[L]egislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."" The Court concluded that if Congress wants Title
VII to protect U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S.
companies, Congress may amend Title VII to do so expressly,
and in the process can "calibrate its provisions in a way that
we cannot.""
Chief among the "calibrations" mentioned is
exempting employers from liability if their conduct is
compelled by the country in which a claimant is employed.'"
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress responded to the
Court's ruling and abrogated Aramco by adding to the Act's
definition of "employee": "[wlith respect to employment in a
foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a
citizen of the United States." 4 5 Congress also provided, as
the Aramco decision suggested, for a "sovereign compulsion"
defense. 46 This defense, however, when appropriate, can be
recognized by courts and administrators without specific
47
Congressional authorization.

142 Id- at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285

(1949)).
"'3 Id. at 1236.
'" See id. at 1234.
14 Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) & 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)).
146 Id. § 109(b).
" See United States v. First Natl City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-05 (2d
Cir. 1968) (recognizing that the defense of sovereign compulsion might deter
the court from issuing a subpoena duces tecum in an antitrust investigation,
but rejecting the defense as not proven); THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 441(1)(a) ("In general, a state may not require a person to do
an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state . . ").
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Aramco is a classic "false conflict" case. The U.S. policies
underlying Title VII were fully applicable to the facts in
Aramco, and the policies would have been violated if U.S. law
was not applied. Moreover, the application of Title VII would
not have interfered with any purpose that Saudi Arabia
wished to have advanced, nor would it have violated Aramco's
justified expectations. Thus, the territorial imperative was not
cogent because no policy of the state where the act occurred
was offended by holding the defendant liable under the law of
the United States, the parties' domicile.
In contrast to the facts in Aramco, application of U.S. law
to the defendants in HartfordFire was explicitly objected to by
the foreign state as an unwarranted interference with its own
comprehensive regulation of the defendants.' 4 8 Thus, there
was a greater impetus for the Court to exercise judicial
restraint when considering the proper reach of the Sherman
Act under the facts of Hartford Fire than under the facts of
Aramco.
5. AFTER HARTFORD FIRE:
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
As the discussion in Section 3 demonstrates, the opinion in
Hartford Fire raises many questions. Justice Souter has
announced a conflict resolution rule that has no analog in
domestic conflict of laws theory, confuses the foreign sovereign
compulsion doctrine, and departs from generally understood
rules of statutory construction.
By requiring the presence of a "true conflict" (in which
compliance with the laws of a foreign state compels the foreign
defendant to engage in conduct violative of U.S. antitrust law)
before it will consider comity, the Court has made it unlikely
that a conflict will be found in which a U.S. court should
decline the exercise of jurisdiction. If and when such a
situation occurs, the U.S. court will be bound to decline

" In dissent, Justice Scalia recognized this canon of construction, but
found that with regard to antitrust laws, the question "of whether that
presumption" should control is bound by precedent in the antitrust field,
citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Continental Ore. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
HartfordFire, 113 S.Ct. at 2918, 2919.
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jurisdiction not on the basis of comity, but on the grounds of
the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine or the act of state
doctrine.14 9
The Hartford Fire decision brings to an end the debate
concerning the propriety of a Timberlane comity analysis.
While not explicitly rejecting the Timberlane approach or
endorsing the Laker approach, the Court's conflict resolution
test will result in the outcome advocated by Judge Wilkey in
the international conflict of laws context and Professor
Brainerd Currie in the domestic conflict of laws context-the
application of the forum state's law when the forum has any
interest at all in the conduct at issue. Unless Congress
devises rules governing jurisdiction in this situation, U.S.
courts will be free to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction even
when the foreign interests are deemed substantial, as long as
the conduct at issue was not compelled.
While the "true conflict" rule is flawed, the Court was
The"
correct in affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision.
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the British defendants
entered into an agreement to use "their best endeavors to
ensure that all U.S.A. and Canadian exposed. insurance/
reinsurance business ... [would] only be written where the
original business includes a seepage and pollution exclusion
The Ninth Circuit agreed
wherever legal and applicable."'
with the district court that the claims at issue conflicted with
foreign law, because Great Britain had a long-established
tradition of regulating the London insurance market. The
court found, however, that this factor was outweighed by the
other Timberlane factors. Most notably, the court found that
substantially all of the effects of the reinsurers' conduct took
place in the United States. "[Tihe actions of the foreign
defendants ha[ve] had the kind of 'real economic consequences'
for the American economy that strongly weigh in favor of the
Property insurance and
exercise of jurisdiction."' 5"

'" The Court does not address whether in the event of a "true conflict"
a comity analysis is proper. If a court, however, finds a true conflict such
an analysis would be unnecessary.
150 See Complaint at

9 112.

"" In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1991),
aff'd in relevant part and rev's in part sub nom, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
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reinsurance policies for U.S. risks excluded seepage, pollution
and contamination coverage, or provided such coverage only at
increased prices. 5 '
The Ninth Circuit- applied the correct approach,
emphasizing the degree of effect that the foreign conduct had
on the United States, in deciding whether to engage in a
comity analysis.'
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
enactment of the FTAIA in 1982 had substantially diminished
the weight to be given to the interests of a foreign state when
deciding whether to apply U.S. antitrust law.M
In an increasingly interdependent world-with the advent
of such economic arrangements as the European Union and
the North American Free Trade Agreement-national and
multinational companies operating abroad should be held
accountable to the United States when their foreign conduct
adversely affects U.S. commerce in violation of domestic
economic law.'
If the prescriptions of U.S. regulatory
legislation are not applied beyond its territorial frontiers,
cartelists will be encouraged to seek antitrust havens from
which to conduct their operations.'
Indeed, Section 415 of

152

Complaint at 1

114, 139.

'In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 932 ("the relative
significance of effects on the United States").
'5 See id. at 931-33.

"' Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
772 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that parties availing
themselves of U.S. courts should expect to be subject to judgment as well);
Laker, 731 F.2d at 924 (observing that denial of jurisdiction would harm
Laker's principal American creditors); United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
"6 To aid in preventing this occurrence and reduce conflict between
states, the United States has entered into various agreements on mutual
cooperation in enforcement of antitrust laws. Perhaps the most significant
agreement yet concluded is that of September 26, 1991 between the United
States and the EU. Agreement Regarding the Application of Antitrust
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-EEC, 30 I.L.M. 1491. The Agreement provides
for notification of enforcement activities that may affect important interests
of the other party (art. II), exchange of information on enforcement activities
and priorities accompanied by discussion of policy changes that are under
consideration (art. III), and cooperation and coordination in enforcement
activities (art. IV). Significantly, the Agreement recognizes that activities
in the territory of one party may "adversely affect important interests of the
other Party." Id. art. V(1). The Agreement seeks to avoid conflicts over
enforcement activities (art. VI(3)), and to this end states criteria similar to
those in section 403 of the Third Restatement-ForeignRelations. Id. art.
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succinctly

Any agreement in restraint of United States trade
that is made outside of the United States, and any
conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is
carried out predominantly outside of the United States,
are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United
States, if a principal purpose of the conduct or
agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the
United States, and the agreement or conduct has some
effect on that commerce. 5 7
If the unlawful conduct of foreigners is intended to have a
substantial impact on domestic commerce and does in fact
have such an effect, U.S. courts should preside over related
antitrust actions unless the U.S. executive branch clearly
expresses a contrary opinion, or unless Congress has enacted
a specifically applicable prohibition.' 5 8
The legislative
purpose in enacting the FTAIA was to make the application of
the Sherman Act to foreign conduct more predictable. The
FTAIA has replaced the ad hoc judgments about international
comity required by the Timberlane balancing test 5 . with an
VI(3).

§ 415(2). See also Laker,
F.2d 909.
158 It is well-settled that the conduct of foreign affairs is committed to the
exclusive authority of the political branches of government. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918) ("[tlhe conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--'the
political'-Departments"). The Executive Branch is the constitutional
representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("[T]he President
157 THIRD RESTATEMENT-FOREIGN RELATIONS

731

alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.").
1.9 The Court in Laker made a comprehensive examination of those
decisions in which jurisdiction was declined under the Timberlane interest
balancing approach. The court concluded that:
A pragmatic assessment of those decisions adopting an interest
balancing approach indicates none where United Statesjurisdiction
was declined when there was more than a de minimis United States
interest ... When push comes to shove, the domestic forum is
rarely unseated.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 950-51 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Commentators have also severely criticized Timberlane's demand that the
judiciary engage in weighing national interests, noting that it is not in
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objective standard that focuses on the effects of export trade
on domestic commerce. 60 The FTAIA standard is whether
export conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce.' 6'
Although the FTAIA, by its terms, does not apply to import
commerce, Congress clearly stated that the FTAIA does not in
any way reduce the applicability of the Sherman Act to import
trade such as that involved in Hartford Fire." That the
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" test does not
apply to products sold into the United States by foreign
producers is indefensible. It would be difficult to defend a
construct of the FTAIA that permitted greater immunity for
imports directly into the United States than for trade aimed
outside the United States which has an incidental effect on
U.S. commerce.'
accordance with international law (Erika Nijenhuis, Antitrust Suits
Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions for ProtocolReform, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1987)) and "open[s] up a Pandora's box of indeterminacy
and unchecked judicial discretion" (Note, Predictability and Comity:
Toward Common Principles of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,98 HARV. L.
REV. 1310, 1312 n.11 (1985)). Professor Hawk has noted that "courts that
have adopted a Timberlane approach are inconsistent both in their laundry
list of factors to be balanced and in their balancing of those factors." Barry
E. Hawk, InternationalAntitrust Policy and 1982 Acts: The Continuing
Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 205 (1982).
10 See H.R. REP. No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487-88; 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (1988).
16 d. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487.

See H.R. REP. No. 97-686 at 9, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2494
("it is important that there be no misunderstanding that import restraints,
which can be damaging to American consumers, remain covered by the law
162

... [t]o remove any possible doubt, the Subcommittee amendment ...

modified the legislation to make clear that it applied only to 'export' trade");
128 CONG. REc. H18,953 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982) (statement of Sen.
McClory) (noting that the FTAIA "does not address our domestic trade nor,
for that matter, our import trade since imports invariably have an impact
on our domestic trade").
163 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 236a
(1992 Supp.) (concluding that the better view is that FTAIA"merely codifies
a general understanding of when American antitrust law should be
concerned about restraints abroad that might affect United States
interests").
As early as 1985, following the adoption of the FTAIA, the U.S. Senate
addressed directly the idea of comity. Senate Bill 397 would have required
U.S. courts in private antitrust suits to dismiss "suits in which the adverse
effects on foreign interests outweighs the plaintiff's interest in prosecuting
the antitrust claim." See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act:
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Until the Court directly addresses whether there is any
role for comity, and in the absence of further Congressional
action, the most utilitarian perspective is for businesses and
courts to view antitrust cases as falling into three categories
based upon the degree of impact the challenged conduct has on
U.S. commerce.

In cases where the challenged conduct has virtually none
or a de minimis effect on U.S. commerce, courts should not
apply U.S. antitrust law and the issue of comity should not be
considered.'
Conversely, in cases where the challenged conduct has a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effect on U.S.
commerce, courts should apply U.S. antitrust law regardless
6 5
of the outcome under an interest balancing analysis.
Finally, in cases where the challenged conduct has more
than a "minimal" but less than a "substantial" effect on U.S.
commerce, courts should engage in an interest balancing
analysis and apply U.S. antitrust law if relevant factors favor
the United States.'66
This classification system emphasizes the purpose and
effect of the challenged foreign conduct. It is faithful to the
FTAIA, and fully consistent with domestic conflict of laws
theory. Further, it properly limits the courts' role in foreign

Hearingson S. 397 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1985) (opening statement of Chairman Strom Thurmond). The bill
died after meeting stiff opposition from the Executive Branch on the
grounds that such an analysis would require the courts to perform a delicate
balancing of national interests and unduly infringed upon the powers of the
Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy. Id. at 8 (Acting Attorney
General testified that "the courts are simply the wrong place, under our
Constitution's allocation of responsibilities and competencies, to engage in
a balancing of conflicting United States and foreign economic policies and
philosophies"); Id. at 28 (State Department expressing view that "this
formulation would invite the courts to make national interests and foreign
relations determinations for the United States and other countries involved
that are political and thus properly for the Executive Branch under our
system of government").
1
' See, e.g., Vespa of Am. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 229
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
"'See, e.g., Industrial Inv.Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th
Cir. 1982); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
""See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Prods.,
Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Colo. 1993).
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policy decisions. .Concomitantly, it provides a degree of
predictability for businesses to gauge their activity and to
make informed decisions with respect to the liability they may
face if their activity affects U.S. commerce.
6. CONCLUSION
While the reasoning of the Supreme Court in HartfordFire
is questionable, the result achieved was necessary. This
decision heralds the outreach of U.S. economic regulatory law
to foreign conduct affecting the U.S. market. The Court's
approach to conflict resolution will encourage private
plaintiffs, state attorneys general and U.S. government
enforcement agencies to aggressively pursue conduct outside
the United States that is lawful where it occurs. In response
to this aggressive behavior, foreign governments will resort to
the use of "blocking" statutes,
and engage in
intergovernmental negotiations, to defend what they perceive
to be legitimate sovereign interests.
U.S. courts, however, must enforce Congressional economic
regulations.
Courts cannot ignore the important public
policies underlying the Sherman Act and other economic
regulations. U.S. courts must assert jurisdiction over persons
in foreign nations who conspire to violate U.S. law and who
intend to cause or actually cause substantial effects on
American domestic markets.
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